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Authoritarian Liberalism 
Alexander Somek*, University of Iowa 
Abstract: In light of the reforms undertaken for the sake of the Euro, the article revisits the con-
cept authoritarian liberalism that was introduced in 1933 by the German public law scholar 
Hermann Heller. This notion seeks to capture the liaison between the “strong state” and eco-
nomic liberalism. The article suggests that this notion can be fruitfully used to designate the new 
governance of economic and monetary union. It argues, particularly, that it makes sense to 
speak of an authoritarian style of governance even if the latter does not wear vestiges of out-
right repression. Two different faces of authoritarian liberalism can be distinguished: one that 
looks more towards authoritarianism and another one that views authoritarian rule as a man-
agerial strategy that is good for the economy. The article then speculates whether the European 
Union has been, indeed, successful because it shifts between the two. Disturbingly, there may be 
something deeply as well as more accidentally authoritarian about European integration. 
Keywords: European Union; authority; transnational governance; delegation; trust. 
I. Major changes
As is well known, over the last six years the Member States of the European Union have been 
wrestling with a banking crisis, a fiscal crisis and a real economic crisis.1 While responses to the 
first crisis have now materialized in plans for a “banking union”,2 the two latter crises have occa-
sioned to a whole series of measures, not least because they implicated the viability of Monetary 
Union. Various efforts at tackling the Fiscal Crisis and its implications for the financing of sover-
eign debt have profoundly altered the legal framework of Economic and Monetary Union. These 
relevant reforms concern two areas of law. 
First, existing law concerning economic convergence3 was amended, in particular with regard to 
the multilateral surveillance of economic performance and the prevention of excessive benefits. 
The core of these reforms is manifest in the strong and deep-reaching involvement of the Com-
mission the economic and budgetary planning of the Member States. Key thereto is the “Europe-
* Alexander Somek holds the Charles E. Floete Chair in Law at the University of Iowa. 
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Law Department of the London School of Economics and Po-
litical Science, the Iowa Legal Studies Workshop and at the Georgetown University Law Centre. The author would
like to thank all participants for their feedback. 
1  I am following Streeck’s depiction of the situation. WOLFGANG STREECK, GEKAUFTE ZEIT: DIE VERTAGTE KRISE DES DEMO-
KRATISCHEN KAPITALISMUS (Suhrkamp 2013). For a more complex picture that identifies five crises, see Agustin 
Menendez, The Existential Crisis of the European Union, 14 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL, 2013, at 453. 
2  See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-570_en.htm?locale=en. 
3  It has essentially is basis in Articles 121-126 and Article 136 TFEU. 
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an Semester”, which provides the Commission with access to the whole field of domestic policy 
planning.4 What is more, not only do Member States of Euro Zone have to submit to the Commis-
sion and to the Eurogroup a draft budgetary plan for the forthcoming year5 and are subject, un-
der certain conditions, to visitations by “review missions”,6 sanctions can now be imposed on 
them on the ground of their failure to comply with recommendations7 or corrective actions 
plans.8 These are the innovations that we associate with the Reform of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (“Six Pack”,9 “Two Pack”10) and the Fiscal Compact.11 
                                                
4  See Article 2a of Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies. It was introduced by Regulation 1175/2011 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 16 November 2011. The European Semester involves the formulation, and surveillance 
of the implementation, of broad economic policy guidelines; the tasks of formulation and surveillance are extended 
also to employment guidelines (Art 148[2] TFEU), the stability or convergence programs, national reform programs 
supporting the Union’s strategy for growth and jobs and the prevention of correction of macroeconomic imbalanc-
es. Even the “enhanced monitoring of budgetary policies” is supposed to “complement” the European Semester. See 
Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 473/2013 of the European Parliament of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provi-
sions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States of the euro area. Arguably, the European semester is the gate through which the Commission en-
ters domestic policy planning and through which it never leaves. For a sketch of how the European semester works, 
see http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/the_european_semester/index_en.htm.  
5  See Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013. 
6  See Article 3(5) Regulation 472/2013. 
7  See Council Regulation 1177/2011 of November 2011 amending Council Regulation 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. The new Article 7 has speeded 
up the imposition of sanctions.  
8  See Articles 3 to 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area. 
9  The (reformed) Stability and Growth Pact consists of regulations concerning the prevention and correction of 
excessive deficits and macroeconomic imbalances. See Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthen-
ing of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies; Regu-
lation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective 
enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area; Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances: 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding 
up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure; Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive mac-
roeconomic imbalances in the euro area; Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for 
budgetary frameworks of the Member States; Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and en-
suring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area; Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary 
surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect 
to their financial stability. For the legal problems raised, see Martin Höpner & Florian Rödl, Illegitim und 
rechtswidrig: Das neue makroökonomische Regime im Euroraum, 92 WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST 219, 219-222 (2012); Jürgen Bast 
& Florian Rödl, Jenseits der Koordinierung? Zu den Grenzen der EU-Verträge für eine Europäische Wirtschaftsregierung, 
39 EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTEZEITSCHRIFT, 2012, at 269; Mark Dawson & Floris de Witte, Constitutional Balance in the 
EU after the Euro-Crisis, 76 MODERN LAW REVIEW, 2013, at 817. 
10  Two regulations, based upon Article 136 and Article 121(6) TFEU, were adopted in order to strengthen the coordina-
tion and surveillance of budgetary policies among Member States in the Eurozone. Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing 
draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area and 
Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of 
economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability. The first regulation applies to all euro area Member States, with 
special rules applying to those in the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, namely the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure. The second Regulation sets out “clear and simplified rules” for enhanced surveillance for Member States 
facing severe difficulties with regard to their financial stability, those receiving financial assistance, and those exiting 
a financial assistance program. We shall return to some of the provisions of these regulations below. 
11  The official name of the Fiscal Compact is “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union“. 
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Second, when the Member States were first confronted with the potential default of countries 
like as Greece, they had to answer the simple and important question whether the original treaty 
framework was indeed susceptible to flexible complementation.12 As originally understood, the 
Treaty had made no credit available to Member States from the ECB qua lender of last resort 
(Article 123 TFEU) and had also seemed to have ruled out that Member States somehow assume 
the liability of any other (Article 125 TFEU). The exigency of rescuing the common currency, how-
ever, soon made the Member States divine ways of working around existing constraints, for ex-
ample, by using the solidarity clause of Article 122(2) TFEU as a basis for adopting the regulation 
introducing the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism.13 More importantly, outside the 
Treaty framework they quickly created institutions charged with helping debt-challenged Mem-
ber States to restructure their sovereign debt, such as the European Financial Stability Facility and 
the European Stability Mechanism. The Euro Zone remained sustainable owing to amendments 
that were anchored in Public International Law.14 
II. Obvious problems 
Not surprisingly, the amendment of existing law and the creation of new institutions have been 
persistently trailed by two recurring challenges. They have been concomitant to European inte-
gration for decades. The first challenge questions whether or not the Union or the Member 
States really have the legal power to adopt the relevant measures15 (for example, of introducing 
reverse qualified majority voting when it comes to imposing sanctions in the context of multilateral 
surveillance).16 This ultra vires challenge is often complemented with the other challenge alleging 
that European crisis management has exacerbated the already existing “democracy deficit”.17  
Remarkably, in this context the competence challenge appears in a dual format that looks toward 
the democracy deficit. Not only is it debatable whether, for example, the Member States have the 
power to assign in the Fiscal Compact certain tasks to the Union institutions without the consent 
                                                
12  As Scharpf points out correctly, it would have been possible to let Greece default on its debt on the basis of a 
strict construction of Maastricht rules. For such a “tough luck” approach, see FRITZ W. SCHARPF, NO EXIT FROM THE 
EURO-RESCUING TRAP? 5 MPIFG DISCUSSION PAPER at 7 (2014). 
13  See Council Regulation 407/2010. 
14  See Pieter-Augustijn Van Malleghem, Pringle: A Paradigm Shift in the European Union’s Monetary Constitution, 14 
GERMAN LAW JOURNAL, 2013, at 141. 
15  The Pringle case concerned the legality of the European Stability Mechanism. See Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ire-
land, [2012] ECR I-nyr. The conclusion of the Fiscal Compact generated a great deal of critical observation. See, 
for example, P.P Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: principle, politics, pragmatism, 37 EUROPEAN 
LAW REVIEW 231, 238-239 (2012). The current saga concerning the Outright Monetary Policy (OMT) of the ECB, 
which allows it to buy debt from Member States that receive credits from the ESM, involves an ultra vires chal-
lenge by the Federal Constitutional Court, which still needs to be answered by the ECJ. For an account of the story, 
see Armin Steinbach, The Legality of European Central Bank’s Sovereign Bond Purchases, 39 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ONLINE, 2013, at 15. This challenge seems to be a major blow to the rescue efforts not least because 
the OMT policy seems to have helped a lot to help the Member States concerned. 
16  For a skeptical view, see Martin Höpner & Florian Rödl, Illegitim und rechtswidrig: Das neue makroökonomische Regime 
im Euroraum, 92 WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST 219, 219-222 (2012); Jürgen Bast & Florian Rödl, Jenseits der Koordinierung? Zu den 
Grenzen der EU-Verträge für eine Europäische Wirtschaftsregierung, 39 EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTEZEITSCHRIFT, 2012,  
at 269.  
17  See, for example, Agustin Menendez, Editorial: A European Union in Constitutional Mutation?, 20 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, 
2014, at 127; Ruth Fox, Europe, Democracy and the Economic Crisis: Is It Time to Reconstitute the “Assise”? 65 PARLIAMEN-
TARY AFFAIRS, 2012, at 463. See already FRITZ W. SCHARPF, MONETARY UNION, FISCAL CRISIS AND THE PREEMPTION OF DEMOC-
RACY, 11 MPIFG DISCUSSION PAPER (2011). 
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of the Union;18 rather, the new institutions and strategies of crisis management in their operation 
threaten to unsettle the institutional balance between the Union and the Member States.19 Such 
an indirect subversion of the allocation of powers, which effectively absorbs powers on the part 
of the Member States, can be observed for both areas of reform,20 i.e., the revised Stability and 
Growth Pact, on the one hand, and the working of various “bailout” arrangements, on the other.  
First, a permanent and systematic interference with national competence can be observed for 
multilateral surveillance, in particular for the European Semester.21 Within its scope of applica-
tion, this is particularly obvious for the alert mechanism concerning macroeconomic imbalances22 
and the “enhanced surveillance” of Member States, in particular if these receive financial assis-
tance from the IMF or European institutions.23 Within the context of the macroeconomic imbal-
ance procedure, the Commission is empowered to use a “scoreboard” of macroeconomic indica-
tors24 in order to assess a Member State’s situation and to initiate, possibly, an in-depth review.25 
The use of these indicators feeds into recommendations that the Member States will receive 
about where they have to save or where they had better improve. In the event that the Commis-
sion finds that the Member State might be confronted with an “excessive” economic imbalance 
the Member State is expected to come up with a corrective action plan. This plan is subject to 
censure and approval by the Council.26  
The review by the Commission and the interaction with the Council cut across all areas of public 
policy. They concern particularly those fields for which the Union has no jurisdiction. Therefore, it 
is now finally fair to say that owing to the Union’s impact on budgetary planning, there is “nucleus 
of sovereignty” left to the Member States.27 What is more, national parliaments are not at all 
major players in this process.28 While parliaments need to be informed and discuss budgetary 
planning in one or the other committee, any real opposition is likely to be told by the government 
that, in order to avert the imposition of severe sanctions, the government has to comply with the 
demands made by the Commission.29 It also not the case that this loss of influence, which is fairly 
typical by standards of European integration, is matched with the growing influence of the Euro-
                                                
18  See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Lukas Oberndorfer, Fiskalvertrag und Unionsrecht: Unionsrechtliche Grenzen völker-
rechtlicher Fiskalregulierung und Organleihe, 66 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 2013, at 9; Lukas Oberndorfer, Der 
Fiskalpakt: Umgehung der “europäischen Verfassung“ und Durchbrechung demokratischer Verfahren?, JURIDIKUM 168, 
168-179 (2012). 
19  See Mark Dawson & Floris de Witte, Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis, 76 MODERN LAW REVIEW, 
2013, at 817. For an in-depth analysis of this development, see Philomila Tsoukala, Euro-Zone Management and 
the New Social Europe, 20 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW, 2013, at 32.  
20  This important point is made by Tsoukala, note 19. 
21  See Mark Hallerberg & Benedicta Marzinotto & Guntram B. Wolff, On the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of EU Eco-
nomic Policies, 4 BRUEGELPOLICYBRIEF 1,2 (2012). With regard to the European Semester Tsoukala, note 19 at 66, ob-
serves “a carry-over of loan conditionality into the overall process of policy coordination with the euro zone”. Fis-
cal coordination now implicates matters such as labour, social and tax policy. 
22  See Article 3 of Regulation 1176/2011. 
23  See Article 2(6) Regulation 472/2013. 
24  See Article 4 of Regulation 1176/2011. 
25  See Article 5 leg cit. 
26  See, in particular, Article 8(3) leg cit. 
27  See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 
1990, at 205, who claimed that no “nucleus of sovereignty” had been left for the Member States; in a similar vein, 
George A. Berman, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, 94 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 1994, at 331. 
28  There is a great variety of different forms of involvement, mostly through committees. See DG FOR INTERNAL POLI-
CIES, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER at 68–76 (IP/A/ECON/ST/2010-24, 2012). 
29  Of course, some political gamesmanship may be involved here too. Sometimes the recommendations by the 
Council do not fall on fertile ground. See Hallerberg et al, note 21 at 5. 
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pean Parliament.30 The various processes precipitated in the context of the European Semester 
basically involve national governments and supranational executive institutions.  
For example, members of the Euro Zone have to submit annually to the Commission and the Eu-
rogroup a draft budgetary plan for the upcoming year. The Commission is to issue an opinion on 
this draft.31 Only at the request of the Member State’s parliament has the Commission also to pre-
sent its opinion to the national parliament.32 Nonetheless, this opinion is important, for it provides a 
basis for discussion within the Eurogroup.33 Matters appear to be even more aggravated in the 
context of “enhanced surveillance” in which Member States, even if they are not subject to a 
bailout,34 have to report to the European Central Bank and carry out various stress tests at its re-
quest.35 What is more, a Member State concerned has to introduce mechanisms of closer monitor-
ing of its financial situation and to submit quarterly reports.36  
The transfer of authority over policy-making from the domestic to the supranational level becomes 
more pronounced once a Member State has become subject to the excessive deficit procedure. The 
Member State is then under an obligation to present an “economic partnership program”,37 which 
is supposed “to identify and select a number of specific priorities aiming to enhance competitive-
ness and long-term sustainable growth and addressing structural weaknesses in the Member State 
concerned”.38 Unsurprisingly, these priorities are expected to be “consistent with the Union’s strat-
egy for growth and jobs.”39 
Second, the refinancing of sovereign debt through the ESM is negotiated with the troika, among 
which the European Commission plays a most important role.40 The terms of conditions of actual 
Memoranda of Understanding seem to be consistent with the mindset of the Washington consen-
sus. They are likely to include the privatization of public services or to address certain “rigidities” of 
labour law or wage formation.41 In the case of Greece the package of conditions seems to amount 
even to a program for reinventing the Greek state.42 Since the Commission has over the years put 
greater emphasis on restoring external balance through internal devaluation (rather than reducing 
debt), employment relationships and employability through lower wages or lower employment 
costs have become a focus of concern.43 In can be observed, in this context, that the conditionality 
                                                
30  See, Menendez, note 17 at 138; Hallerberg et al, note 21 at 5. 
31  See Article 6(1) and 7(1) of Regulation 473/2013. 
32  See Article 7(3) of Regulation 473/2013. 
33  See Article (5) of Regulation 473/2013. 
34  The Commission has discretion to submit a Member State to enhanced surveillance if that Member State experi-
ences or is threatened with experiencing “serious difficulties with respect to its financial stability which are likely 
to have adverse spill-over effects on other Member States in the euro area.” Article 2(1) Regulation 472/2013. 
35  See Article 3(3)(a) and (b) Regulation 472/2013. 
36  See Article 10(2) and (3) Regulation 473/2013. Generally, such closer monitoring is supposed to be facilitated 
domestically through the introduction of independent bodies. See Article 5 of Regulation 473/2013. 
37  See Article 9(1) of Regulation 473/2013. 
38  Article 9(2) of Regulation 473/2013. 
39  Ibid. 
40  See Scharpf, note 12 at 12. 
41  For a description, see Tsoukala, note 19 at 57–65. Article 7(1)(4) explicitly states that adjustment programs “shall 
take into account the practice and institutions of wage formation and the national reform programme of the 
Member State concerned in the context of the Union’s strategy for growth and jobs.” This can mean that the 
memorandum either is supposed to respect them or to address the problems that they pose in the context of 
the strategy for growth and jobs. 
42  See Philomila Tsoukala, Narratives of the European Crisis and the Future of Social Europe, 48 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL 241, 259 et seqq (2013). 
43  See Scharpf, note 12 at 12; Tsoukala, note 19 at 61–65. 
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developed for GIIPS economies becomes generalized in the context of the European semester and 
may even amount to Europe’s new—liberal and residual—social model.44  
Evidently, also in this context, participation by parliaments really does not play a role. Rather, Member 
States receiving financial assistance subject to conditionality on a precautionary basis are subject to 
enhanced surveillance.45 Those Member States that receive financial assistance from one or several 
other Member States or third countries, the EFSM, the ESM, EFSK or the IMF are required to draw 
up macroeconomic adjustment programs.46 These are to be harmonized with Memoranda of Under-
standing concluded between the Member State the relevant financial institution.47 The Commission 
(in liaison with the ECB and possibly also the IMF) is in charge of monitoring the progress48 made by 
the Member State and of examining (with the Member State) whether the adjustment program 
needs to be “updated”.49 In the event that a state experiences “insufficient administrative capacity” 
or other significant problems in implementing the program it has to seek “technical assistance from 
the Commission, which may constitute, for that purpose, groups of experts composed of members 
from other Member States and other Union institutions or from relevant international institu-
tions.”50 Such a capacity building group may actually take residence in the Member State concerned.  
This emergent picture of top-down and peer group governance is complemented by the fact that, 
aside from lip service paid to the social partners,51 national parliaments are merely assured their 
right to invite Commission members to an “exchange of views” before their relevant committee.52 
This is a rather blatant way of admitting the national parliaments do not matter.  
All of these regulations have one feature in common that goes to the heart of the rule of law. For 
the outside observer, at any rate, they comprise a rather confusing array of procedures that are 
supposed to “complement”53 their recently introduced predecessors. De facto they are just grafted 
upon one another. Apparently, only those “in the know” or “in charge” will know how to knit their 
own procedural routines from a web of ever increasing complexity. Evidently, the powerlessness on 
the part of the Union to adopt national budgets—in neoliberal political newspeak: its lack of “own-
ership” of national budgetary processes—gives rise to a nasty overregulation of the national politi-
cal progress that benefits those pulling the overlapping regulations together in the course of their 
application.  
                                                
44  See Tsoukala, note 19 at 66, 74-75. 
45  See Article 2(3) and (4) Regulation 472/2013. 
46  Article 7(1) Regulation 472/2013. If the Member State is already in an economic partnership program pursuant to 
Article 9(1) of Regulation 473/2013 the adjustment program shall build upon it or replace it.  
47  See Article 7(2)(2) Regulation 742/2013. 
48  See Article 7(5) Regulation 742/2013. 
49  See Article 7(5) Regulation 742/2013. 
50  Article 7(8) Regulation 742/2013. 
51  One provision is repeatedly to be found in the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, which says that the appli-
cations of the relevant regulations “should be in full compliance with Article 152 TFEU”, which recognizes the im-
portance of social partners and pays respect to national systems of wage formation. Moreover, the regulations 
claim to take into account Article 28 of the Fundamental Rights Charter, which guarantees the integrity of sys-
tems of collective bargaining. See, for example, Article 1(2) Regulation 473/2013. This means, in practice, howev-
er, is that the Member State is left to its own devices when it comes to dealing with social partners with “a view to 
contributing to building consensus over its content” (Article 8 of Regulation 472/2013). In clear language, this 
means that the Member States governments are expected to appease the representatives of labour and to 
communicate the necessity of harsh “adjustments”. 
52  See Article 8(9) of Regulation 472/2013. 
53  See Article 1(1) of Regulation 473/2013 listing five procedural contexts that enhanced monitoring of budgetary 
policies is supposed to complement. Evidently, potential collisions are supposed to be “harmonized” in practice. 
See recitals 5 and 6 of Regulation 472/2013. 
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III. Staying the course 
Interestingly, legal scholarship, even though often depressingly brilliant in identifying legal prob-
lems in complex settings, has recently become more cautious and muted and when it comes to 
conceptualizing the consequences of these developments. This is to be regretted, not least be-
cause European Union scholarship has always been at its best when it linked the identification of 
new developments with bold speculations concerning what these developments reveal of the 
nature of the Union. Indeed, European Union legal scholarship would not be the wonderful genre 
that it is if it did not invite various efforts to explore the elusive essence of the beast.54  
In this vein — and light of the observations concerning the demise of parliamentary control over 
budgetary planning — the article suggests that the current situation is strangely reminiscent of 
what Hermann Heller described in 1932/33 as “authoritarian liberalism”.55 Heller’s original observa-
tion concerned a certain program designed to rebuild Germany from economic and political col-
lapse. In his view it deserved this appellation because it promised (1) to introduce a “strong 
state”, unyielding to the demands made by labour56 (2) to solve the economic crisis in a manner 
that restores entrepreneurship and (3) to be informed by expertise and thus to rescue the exer-
cise of public power from the vagaries of “politics”.57  
Having used the designator “authoritarian liberalism” recklessly before,58 the author now takes it 
upon himself to move beyond polemical exploits. Of course, the fact needs to be addressed that 
“authoritarian liberalism” on its surface does not look authoritarian at all. European economic 
and monetary crisis management has not yet resorted to banning political parties or relied on 
marauding black shirts, aggressive storm troopers, the removal of unwanted people or the shut-
down of constitutional courts. The powers that be also do not make it a point to symbolise unity 
                                                
54  Honestly, it would otherwise be roughly as exciting as international trade law.  
55  See HERMANN HELLER, AUTORITÄRER LIBERALISMUS? (1933), reprinted in GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN, VOL 2. 643–653 (A.W. 
Sijthoff 1971). 
56  From a historical perspective, at any rate, a more fascinating story can be told about the economists who will 
come to be known as “ordoliberals” (Eucken, Rüstow, Röpke) or as active supporters of the “social market econ-
omy” (Müller-Armack). They were thrilled about the “strong state”, for it promised to restore the authority of the 
state vis-à-vis social forces. Quite remarkably, some (Röpke) believed that the strong state could only take hold if 
it was supported by an activating “myth”. See DIETER HASELBACH, AUTORITÄRER LIBERALISMUS UND SOZIALE 
MARKTWIRTSCHAFT: GESELLSCHAFT UND POLITIK IM ORDOLIBERALISMUS 40, 60 et seq. (Nomos, 1991). On the ordoliberals 
and European integration, see DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PRO-
METHEUS 334 (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
57  Heller’s phenomenology of “authoritarian liberalism” is straightforward and simple. The core principle is that of 
authority instead of majority (Heller, note 55 at 645). Yet, the authoritarian support of economic liberalism was 
not at all about some quasi-religious redemption (646) to be precipitated by some fascist duce or Führer. Rather, 
authoritarian liberalism casts itself as a matter of rational insight into economic necessity. It bases itself not on li-
bidinous identification with the leader but on syllogisms and inferences saying that there is no alternative to the 
depoliticization of the economy and cut-downs on social programs (652-653). Authoritarian liberalism purports 
to be based on knowledge. It is, put in currently fashionable vocabulary, the extension of the “knowledge-based” 
economy to the sphere of politics. The market is taken to be the ultimate template of social improvement. Heller 
cites Papen as saying that work is the happiness of a people (652). The authoritarian liberal state withdraws from 
economic production and distribution (652). It favours austerity without, however, reducing subsidies for large 
banks and large industries (652). It thereby indirectly supports inequality. Such a program, Heller contends, can 
be sustained only against the will of the people, “for the German people would not long tolerate this neoliberal 
state in democratic forms” (653). 
58  See, for example, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti-Discrimination Law, at 45 (Oxford University 
Press, 2011). Others have used it not recklessly at all. See Lukas Oberndorfer, Die Renaissance des autoritären Lib-
eralismus? Carl Schmitt und der deutsche Neoliberalismus vor dem Hintergrund des Eintritts der “Massen” in die eu-
ropäische Politik, 42 PROKLA, 2012, at 413; Michael A. Wilkinson, The Spectre of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections 
on the Constitutional Crisis of the European Union, 14 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 527, 547–440 (2013).  
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by appearing in uniform or by posting outsized blue banners bearing the golden imprint “More 
Europe”. Rather, they present their actions as an outgrowth of necessity. They claim merely to do 
what would have to be done by anyone whose mind is amenable to rational insight. But precisely 
therein resides the authoritarian element.  
It is submitted that the significance and adequacy of the concept can be proven by departing 
form the facile perspective on democratic legitimacy that one encounters not least in the juris-
prudence of the German Federal Constitutional court. It puts delegation at its centre.59 All actions 
by the Union are based upon the delegation of sovereign powers of the Member States. Against 
this background, the emergence of an authoritarian form of rule needs to be explained from 
within a relationship of delegation, more precisely, a reversal in the relationship of power between 
the delegator and the delegate. Most interestingly, however, the reversal is always and already 
built into the relationship. This can be seen, at least, if one recognizes that delegation is not only 
a legal relationship, but also encompassed by a broader relationship of trust. Authoritarian rule 
emerges, dialectically, from trust.  
The article tries to show that the origin of authoritarian rule lies partly in the modal indifference of 
trust—which explains the reluctance of Courts to “bite” when they are confronted with potential 
ultra vires—and partly in what can be called the trust trap. Then the article suggests that authoritari-
an liberalism is an expression of the administrative face of the cosmopolitan constitutions of the 
Member States. Finally, it concludes by speculating that the only antidote to the consolidation of 
authoritarian liberalism in Europe might be national governments joining their people in their pro-
test. Admittedly, the Euro Zone seems to be “saved” for now. But the rescue does not produce 
output legitimacy across the European Union. While Germans, Austrians and Dutch may be quite 
content the Greeks or Spaniards are paying a heavy prize for it. We can advance towards a re-
form of monetary union only through sustained democratic opposition. 
IV. Reversing the cycle of power 
Any suggestion that Heller’s polemical intervention can be developed into a concept that sheds 
light on our current situation needs to address a significant difference. In contrast to the 1930s, 
parliaments stay in place or at least not repeatedly sent home and re-elected. What happens, 
instead, is that national representative institutions find themselves in a position disturbingly 
similar to outright receivership.60 This can be observed for Member States benefiting from Euro-
pean bailouts. But even aside from this special constellation, representative institutions do defi-
nitely not expand their authority at a rate that would allow them to keep up with the growing 
powers of supranational executive institutions. This is true, in particular, of the European Parlia-
ment.61 The overall situation therefore roughly matches what Colin Crouch so famously and con-
troversially described as “Post-Democracy.” Core democratic institutions, such as parliaments or 
recurring elections, stay formally in place while the substance of political decision-making is no 
                                                
59  At has done so at least since Solange I. See Internationale HandelsGesellschaft mBH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle 
für Getreide und Futtermittel (Solange I) [1974], 2 Common Market Law Reports 540. For a historical account, see 
BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: WEST GERMANY’S CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949–1979, 
78–88 (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
60  For a highly perceptive case study concerning Greece, see Tsoukala, note 42 at 266. 
61  See, with regard to the European Parliament, the very apt observations by Agustin Menendez, Editorial: A Europe-
an Union in Constitutional Mutation?, 20 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, 2014, at 138. 
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longer determined by active citizens and their representatives. Rather, the political process is 
controlled by administrative and economic elites, in particular in the context of transnational 
governance structures.62 Putting the matter starkly, representative institutions appear to have 
become soft and conciliatory. They do not take risks or leave toying with hazardous ideas, such 
as leaving the Union, to the parties on the right end of the political spectrum.63 They behave as 
though they had understood that it is their task to lend symbolic “mass support” to the demands 
of administrative and economic rationality.64  
In the terms of Habermas’ legal philosophy, such a development implies a disturbing reversal of 
the democratically legitimate cycle of power. According to Habermas, democratic politics is in 
good shape so long as it originates from the “communicative power” that is being built up in the 
public sphere.65 This power, which is based on mutual understandings arrived at in the course of 
communicative action, is supposed to determine, by means of law, the exercise of administrative 
power.66 In light of Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action,67 such power must always appear to 
be a countervailing force offsetting the “functional imperatives” originating from the systemic repro-
duction of the economy and the administrative system of the state. It can prevail over such func-
tional imperatives by constraining or directing administrative action through laws. It is through 
legislation that the defiant momentum of communicative power resists the demands of func-
tional imperatives.  
When, however, a lively and energetic public disappears and the people become apathetic68 the 
functional imperatives of the economic and the political system no longer encounter resistance. 
They begin to “colonise” the political process. The focus of politics comes to rest on system-
stabilisation, which is then pursued with great indifference towards the institutional or moral 
background rights of the people.  
Assuming that notions such as “post-democracy” and the image of a “reversal of the cycle of 
power” are helpful in capturing current developments69 they should nonetheless not be mistaken 
                                                
62  See COLIN CROUCH, POST-DEMOCRACY 4, 19 et seq (Polity Press, 2004). 
63  Britain, to be sure, is a special case. 
64  Such a reduction of democracy to the function of lending mass support to economic and administrative impera-
tives has been a topic of critical social theory in the 1970s. See CLAUS OFFE, CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 53 
(J. Keane ed, MIT Press, 1984). and JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATIONSPROBLEME IM SPÄTKAPITALISMUS 17 (Suhrkamp, 
1973). 
65  This is a more attractive view of democratic legitimacy compared with the dreary talk of “input legitimacy”. The 
latter does not recognize the role of civil society and the type of power that originates from the public sphere. 
66  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG: BEITRÄGE ZUR DISKURSTHEORIE DES RECHTS UND DES DEMOKRATISCHEN 
RECHTSSTAATS 187, 209 (Suhrkamp, 1992). 
67  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS, VOL. 2: ZUR KRITIK DER FUNKTIONALISTISCHEN VERNUNFT 
(Suhrkamp, 1981).  
68  Popular apathy may be occasioned by a variety of factors, for example, a widespread sense of disempowerment 
of the impression that, at the end of the day, there are not really any alternatives to what the elite consensus 
presents to be the reasonable way. 
69  Arguably, they are particularly helpful when one is confronted with a case like Greece. The European Commis-
sion is not only quite outspoken about what it perceives necessary to remedy Greece fiscal crisis (e.g., combat-
ting tax evasion, privatizations and, of course, flexible labour markets) it also expects Greece to adopt its liberal 
model of social policy. See Tsoukala, note 60 at 266: “[…] [D]espite the continuing lack of formal exclusive compe-
tence on social policy, the substance of the measures required by the MoU is such that in reality they are dictat-
ing social policy to the finest detail for the countries subjected to them under the guise of fiscal emergency.” It 
seems, hence, that supranational institutions tap the opportunity to recreate democratic polities in the image of 
a model competitive solidarity that endorses entrepreneurship, flexible labour markets and a minimal social 
safety net. See, generally, WOLFGANG STREECK, COMPETITIVE SOLIDARITY—RETHINKING THE “EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL”, 
available at http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp99-8/wp99-8.html (accessed 14 March 2014). 
ALJ 1/2015 Alexander Somek 76 
 
for contemporary authoritarian liberalism. The latter arises within a post-democratic situation 
and it is not co-extensive with it. Triangulating the phenomenon requires focussing on a certain 
aspect of Habermas’ cycle of power, which generally suggests that the propulsion of administra-
tive and economic “self-programming” can be halted through legislative norms. Many of these 
norms, however, need to make room for systemic operations, lest they run the risk of remaining 
ineffectual.70 Constraining and directing while giving room is, however, the task of delegation. 
What comes into perspective, then, are chains of delegation.  
It is submitted, therefore, that a concept of authoritarian rule that is faithful to Heller’s intuitions71 
can be developed—sit venia verbo: dialectically—from the concept of delegation.  
V. Karlsruhe’s view of democratic legitimacy 
When it comes to this, it is helpful to begin with a Panglossian view of delegation. From this angle, 
the Union is perceived through the lens of multilevel constitutionalism. Every move that is made 
by Union institutions is deemed to be backed up by delegations.72 The people delegate power to 
an international organisation pursuant to their constitution. International agreements, such as 
the Union Treaties, provide the organisation with the power to adopt legislative acts, which in 
turn normatively underpin implementing acts. This process is democratic throughout because 
democratic legitimacy is transferred from one level to the next. Just like Nozick’s notorious “justice 
in transfer” is allegedly “justice-preserving”,73 delegation is supposed to transmit democratic legit-
imacy without a loss.74  
In a similar vein, a straightforward defence of the democratic legitimacy of the Union in its current 
form would point out that the institutions of both lopsided intergovernmentalism and suprana-
tional fiscal discipline avail of a democratic pedigree, however “indirect” it might be.75 The Com-
mission is appointed with the consent of the European Parliament to which it also remains ac-
countable (Article 17[8] EU Treaty, Article 234 FEU Treaty). The IMF is accountable to the govern-
ments of its member countries. Governments, at the end of the day, are created in the wake of 
elections and remain responsible to their folks. The ECB, even though independent, is based 
upon an international agreement to which the Member States of the EU consented pursuant to 
their own constitutional procedures. International agreements are not written in stone. They can 
be altered. 
                                                
70  This is an old staple of the debate over “juridification”. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, ‘VERRECHTLICHUNG’ IN VERRECHTLICHUNG 
VON WIRTSCHAFT, ARBEIT UND SOZIALER SOLIDARITÄT 289–343 (F. Kübler ed, Suhrkamp 1986). 
71  The author has made a similar argument before. See his ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Austrian Constitutional 
Doctrine 1933 to 1938 and Its Legacy’ In THE DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE. THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM 
AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS 361, 383 (C. Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds, Hart, 2003). 
72  See Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited, 
36 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW, 1999, at 703. 
73  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Basic Books, 1973). 
74  The text below cannot be as nuanced as the more sophisticated apology of the Union provided by Andrew  
Moravcsik, Is there a “Democratic Deficit” in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis, 39 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, 
2004, at 336. 
75  It should be noted that this perspective on delegation is different from the paradigm of functionalist agency 
theory. Functionalist agency theory takes it for granted that principals have preferences and that they delegate 
powers to agents in order to see this preferences satisfied under conditions of high transaction costs and epis-
temic uncertainty. See, generally, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY 80 (2nd ed, Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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What these observations suggest is that at a most elementary level democratic legitimacy flows 
from acts delegating authority to the authority’s exercise. Delegation is believed to be, borrowing 
Nozick’s parlance, “democracy-preserving”,76 no matter how long the chain of delegations might 
be. How easy or difficult it would be to revoke the delegation—and it is not all too easy in the 
case of the ECB—is a secondary matter.  
VI. Obedience is good 
This view of democratic legitimacy is charmingly simple.77 It is presented here only for heuristic 
purposes in order to highlight how the means of safeguarding democratic legitimacy open the 
door for authoritarian liberalism.  
To delegate means to grant others the power to use their own judgement when they are acting 
on behalf of one’s interest in unforeseen situations. Whoever chooses to delegate relinquishes 
the right, at any rate prima facie, to meddle with how the delegate exercises a given power, at 
least as long as this power is not used excessively. Chains of delegations create powers in order 
to bring about chains of judgement substitutions.78 National parliaments delegate powers to the 
European legislature; the European legislature delegates powers to the European Commission. 
Hence, the Commission can use its own judgement in order to regulate because the European 
legislature has surrendered its own. This surrender is, in turn, facilitated by the surrender on the 
part of national legislatures.  
There are good reasons to have judgement substituted. Chief among them are lack of time, in-
terest, knowledge, special expertise, or—in a supranational context—lack of problem-solving 
ability.79 Evidently, delegation is supposed to fix some incapacity on the part of the delegator. 
There is good reason to delegate when there is reason to believe that the delegate knows better 
than we could what we have reason to do. The good reasons also explain why delegation is not 
merely a legal relationship but more broadly a relationship of trust. We shall return to this matter 
below. 
What this comes down to, in other words, is that one ought to delegate if obedience is good for 
oneself. Whoever exercises delegated authority over some people is in the position to command 
                                                
76  See Moravcsik, note 74. 
77  I do not, of course, suggest that the liberal intergovernmentalism reflected in the sophisticated works of Andrew 
Moravcsik or Robert Keohane espouses such a simple view of the legitimacy of international institutions. These 
authors suggest, rather, that the values of liberal democracy are better served in a setting where the influence of 
local interest groups is neutralized.  
78  Obviously, how I think about delegation is deeply influenced by Joseph Raz’s ideas concerning practical authority. 
The language of the exposition does not, however, slavishly follow Raz’s lead. I mention this merely in order to 
appease those who might expect elaborate references to the “normal justification” or the “preemptive” thesis. 
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 53, 61, 71, 78, 80 (Clarendon Press, 1986). I do not offer exercises in “Raz 
scholasticism” in the text. Yet, American readers may want to ask: Why Raz and not a rational choice-based prin-
cipal-agent theory, which is a more established theoretical vernacular? The answer is straightforward. Principal-
agent theory does not focus directly on the problem of judgment substitution. It begins with preferences and 
how delegation might be necessary to overcome obstacles towards their satisfaction. Only a direct focus on 
judgment substitution allows one to encounter the authoritarian moment that emerges from the relation be-
tween a delegator (principal) and a delegate (agent). It is be feared, indeed, that liberal intergovernmentalism is 
incapable of capturing this moment owing to its emphasis that delegation of power are a function of signalling 
the credibility of long-term commitments. For a highly useful discussion, see MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EU-
ROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA SETTING IN THE EU 31 (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 31. 
79  Of course, principal-agent theories are very perceptive in analysing these reasons. See Pollack, note 78 at 21. 
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obedience by pointing out that obeying is in their interest. What matters, more precisely, is that 
obeying rather than using one’s own judgement is what counts as rational behaviour. If delega-
tion is warranted, obedience is good for the obedient. They abstain from asking stupid questions. 
This is what they are supposed to do. 
VII. The modal openness of trust and the importance of democracy 
Evidently, it is entirely unreasonable to delegate authority unless the delegate is worthy of trust.  
Trust is a remarkable facilitator of action. It helps the trusting institution or person to avoid facing 
the complexity of incalculable consequences. Under conditions of uncertainty, trust makes action 
possible by replacing external predictability with internal confidence.80 One can board an air-
plane so long as one is confident that it is piloted by someone who knows how to fly and to 
communicate with air traffic control. Trust makes boarding possible. 
Trusting confidence must not be completely unfounded. It has to be informed by a variety of 
clues and conditions. Nevertheless, in contrast to law, trust leaves open whether the adequate 
reaction to disappointment is either the normative reassertion of an expectation (“you should 
have”) or the cognitive adjustment to a new situation (“so, this is what you had to do”). Trust defers 
the decision whether one had better expect normatively or cognitively to the point at which one 
is confronted with action. One can either reprimand the delegate for overstepping his mandate 
or realise that a requisite power should have been explicitly granted to her in the first place 
(which is a learning process). Indeed, in the latter case trust is reconfirmed by an amendment 
made by the delegate so long as it is to the benefit of the delegator. 
This modal openness of trust is part of the explanation why the control of delegated powers, 
even if they are legally constituted, is delicate and, indeed, intractable. Delegations presuppose 
trust. The relation of trust overdetermines legal constraints. Consequently, knowing that they have 
to be trusted, delegates can always expect confirmation after the fact, i.e., they can expect learn-
ing on the part of the delegating body or person. Remarkably, the reversal in the direction of 
control is built into the relationship. Precisely because delegates know that they have to be trust-
ed they may expect normatively that delegators expect cognitively and concede them rights to self-
amendment. Owing to the relationship of trust the choice of the normative mode of expectation 
becomes suspended. Puzzlingly, the reversal insinuates even that the delegator ought to respect 
the delegator’s right to amend the mandate flexibly in light of unforeseen situations.  
The modal indifference of trust is not troublesome if the control of the delegate eventually re-
turns to a political body. The judiciary would be bound to sustain the normative mode, which is, 
however, inadequate to the relationship in question. Judges realise this and are reluctant to 
“bite”. Political bodies, by contrast, are free to redefine their relationship to the delegate in the 
face of prior experience. Hence, the effective way of dealing with delegation is democratic con-
trol. Among the mildest forms are oversight by a legislative body and rights of interpellation. 
Revocations of delegation or legislative vetoes sustain trust by rescinding it selectively.  
Indeed, the point of modern parliamentary democracy can be understood from this angle. Gov-
ernments can be cast in the role delegates of the people. They are monitored and overseen by 
                                                
80  See NIKLAS LUHMANN, VERTRAUEN: EIN MECHANISMUS ZUR REDUKTION VON KOMPLEXITÄT 28, 33 (3rd ed. Emke, 1983). 
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representative assemblies that retain the right to question, to demand justifications, to remove 
officers, to dismiss governments and to give instructions in the form of laws. From this perspec-
tive, democracy is the suspension of judgement substitution. The delegate retains the full power 
to revoke obedience in one or the other instance. Authoritarian pretensions can be undone in 
processes of public debate as soon as the delegate is drawn into the forum of politics.  
VIII. Output legitimacy 
Generally, trusting is not unreasonable if it is complemented with a modicum of distrust. The 
infusion of misgivings, however, must not lead to permanent interference with the delegate’s 
judgment. This would undermine the very purpose of delegation. In other words, the delegator 
must never behave as a meddlesome busybody.81 She may only retain, for example, the power to 
change the team periodically depending on how well or how badly it has served her interests 
during a period of stewardship. The basic justification of delegation is, then, accomplishments or, 
in the words of Scharpf, “output legitimacy”.82 Patrons fill out the customer satisfaction form after 
having received the service.  
There is nothing political about the exercise of delegated authority. It is not the type of authority 
that accrues from acting together under conditions of plurality.83 Delegation is an essentially 
“private” affair. The legitimacy of delegated acts depends upon accomplishments. It is immaterial 
whether what is accomplished benefits a monarch, a priesthood, a democratic polity or a private 
person.  
It is not entirely accurate, therefore, to speak, as Scharpf does, of democratic “output legitimacy”. 
In the context of delegation, there is only “output legitimacy”, from which a variety of entities can 
benefit, be these theocracies or pagan princes.  
When it comes to delegations, democratic legitimacy extends only to the recognition of defec-
tiveness and to the choice to fix it. It is not “conferred”, as if it were a title, to the organ acting as 
the delegate. The source of legitimacy of bodies with delegated powers is that obedience is good 
for those choosing to obey them. But the sheer fact that the obedient are a democratic polity 
does not invest the delegates with democratic legitimacy.  
In the literature, to be sure, one frequently encounters the claim that bodies such as central 
banks or even courts enhance democracy because they help to represent and to protect the dif-
fuse interests of consumers against the influence of special interest groups.84 If accepted, this 
claim would have us believe that with regard to their limited task the democratic credentials of 
these bodies are superior to those of elected assemblies. What is insinuated, thereby, is that 
democratic representation is tantamount to aggregating preferences in order to guarantee their 
satisfaction.85 Of course, if such an aggregative function could be performed by one exceptionally 
sympathetic individual—the president, for example—then delegating this task to this one indi-
                                                
81  This explains why the usual principal-agents models of delegation do not fit our framework. 
82  See, for example, FRITZ SCHARPF, GOVERNING EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? (Oxford University Press, 1999).  
83  Yes, Hannah Arendt sends her greetings here. 
84  For a prominent example, see Robert Keohane, Steven Macedo & Andrew Moravcsik, Democracy-Enhancing 
Multilateralism, 63 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 1, 6, 10, 24 (2009). 
85  In the article cited in note 84, at 10, the basic assumption appears to be that democracy ought to maximize 
economic rationality for the greater good.  
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vidual would make his choices “democratic”. But saying that the president (or, for that matter, the 
Central Bank) is the voice of the people would stretch our understanding of democracy consider-
ably since the president (or the Central Bank) could then legitimately aggregate preferences in an 
authoritarian manner. That is, he could claim vis-à-vis all individuals concerned to be blessed with 
greater insight. Exempting oneself from challenges by claiming greater insight is, however, not a 
move that is available to participants in democratic debates.  
Bodies invested with delegated authority can at best be conceived of as extensions of democratic 
institutions. But, similar to crutches, they are not part of the body.  
IX. The trust trap 
In the manner in which the Union presents itself in everyday life it is about accomplishments. It is 
supposed to be good for peace among European nations and to benefit “the consumer.” Delega-
tions of authority to the Union would be democratic only if the Union’s doings could be debated, 
contested and undone within one larger constituency. Yet, we do not avail of it, at least not in the 
full-fledged form in which public contestation feeds directly into constitutional reform. In excep-
tional cases, European voters express their critical voice—such as in the notorious French and 
Dutch referenda—but only in order to be told by political elites that they had been too stupid to 
understand the question. It is on these occasions that the European Union reveals its authoritari-
an face.  
If there is a lack of opportunity to undo delegations in democratic fora the people remain locked 
into what might be called the trust trap. If they are not given an outlet to assert their expectations 
normatively (“This is what we want and you ought to deliver”) they shift, automatically, into the 
cognitive mode (“Okay, we can’t have it”). They begin to “learn.” They adapt to what appears to 
them to be the way of the world. High unemployment, rising inequalities, eroding social stand-
ards, broken lives, meaningless biographies—apparently, this is as good as it gets in a post-
utopian world. Europeans surrender their judgement: “Es ist so bequem, unmündig zu sein ” 86 (it is 
so convenient to receive guidance from others).  
To be sure, the democratic defectiveness of the Union is not caused by the absence of political 
rights or the widespread repression of political opinion. Rather, it is a by-product of its structure. 
While resistance against European Union policies is pointless at home, it is largely homeless in 
the Union. European voters have no party system to connect to and there is no electoral process 
that would allow for real choices concerning the course of European public policy.87 This is not so 
say that this cannot change in the future.88   
Today, however, those Europeans who learn and adapt are perceived to be “reasonable.” They 
demonstrate to have understood that obedience is good for them, at least when they have been 
told to be obedient. There is no alternative.  
                                                
86  Immanuel Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? in 11 WERKE IN ZWÖLF BÄNDEN 53, 53 (W. Weischedel 
ed., Insel 1968). 
87  See Mattias Kumm, Why Europeans will not embrace constitutional patriotism, 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, 2008, at 117. 
88  It must not be ignored, however, that the European Union is so overconstitutionalised, in particular as regards its 
economic constitution, that there is not much room left for political choices.  
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X. Authoritarian rule: From paternalism to blind faith 
Obedience is good for the obedient. This is the basic principle of delegated authority. This principle 
becomes authoritarian if it is extended to assessing the soundness of delegations. More precisely, 
while delegation creates authority by virtue of surrendering judgment, the expectation of yielding 
and deference becomes authoritarian if the delegate vicariously surrenders on behalf of the delega-
tor. The former then confers power on himself in the name of the latter.  
The idea underlying the move from delegation to authoritarianism is, however, distressingly 
plausible. The delegator delegates to the delegate because she perceives in herself a certain 
incapacity. But why should the delegator, given that she is burdened with an incapacity, be capable 
of recognizing the circumstances under which it is imperative to delegate? Doesn’t it take a dele-
gate for that? As is well known, intoxicated persons are not only severely impaired in their driving 
skills, but also incapable of recognizing their impairment. Authoritarian solutions make the rele-
vant call for those lacking the capacity to do so themselves.  
The authoritarian principle according to which the delegate must delegate on behalf of the delega-
tor can be encountered in at least three different contexts. 
First, authority becomes authoritarian when a further extension of delegation is taken for granted, 
that is, whenever the delegate acts on the basis of the supposition that the delegators would 
have given him more power had they only known in advance about newly arisen circumstances.89 
This explains why executive powers expand. Their self-amendment is an outgrowth of trust. In-
deed, it is perfectly legitimate for the delegate to presume that in tricky situations the delegators 
should resolve the question of trust cognitively (“well, of course that’s what she has to do”) and 
provide the delegate post factum with a clean bill of health. Thus understood, the delegate can 
attribute to herself, paradoxically, a right to self-amendment. I mentioned already above that 
authoritarianism is distressingly plausible. 
Second, authority becomes authoritarian when democratic scrutiny of the reasonableness of 
delegation is at least strongly presumed to be ill-founded. The language of modern political sci-
ence, such as liberal intergovernmentalism, bespeaks the relevant perspective.90 Where the 
democratic pursuit of interests is contrasted with the supposedly impartial judgement of execu-
tive bodies, any well-organized group with a visible agenda must, by virtue of its very existence, 
raise the suspicion of overriding the voice of the silent majority. Authoritarianism would then 
counsel in favour of putting groups into their place. 
Third, authority is clearly authoritarian if the choice of people on whether to delegate is consid-
ered to be an obstacle towards something greater. This obstacle may be attributed to the influ-
ence of myopia, lack of class-consciousness or other factors. The will of the people counts as an 
obstacle that has to be overcome by the authoritarian leader. 
Here is, then, the core of authoritarianism: Obedience is good for the obedient even if they do not 
understand why. Precisely because they do not understand that obedience is good for them they 
need to obey.  
                                                
89  Principal-agent models of delegation would at this point say that delegation facilitates the amendment of incom-
plete bargains. See Pollack, note 78 at 23. This bespeaks the bias of the theory in favour of stronger international 
integration, for it thereby ignores the operation of the trust trap.  
90  See, for example, the work cited in note 84.  
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Since authoritarianism is basically about obedience it is consistently applied only if the exercise of 
authority is itself presented as obedience to something greater. Moreover, given that obedience 
is owed, in its authoritarian form, precisely because one does not understand the reason for obe-
dience, truly authoritarian rule is based upon blind faith or unconditional devotion to a cause. 
- With that in mind we can return to Heller’s little piece and tease out two complementary 
understandings of authoritarian liberalism. 
XI. The ambivalence of authoritarian liberalism 
In retrospect, Heller’s tentative exploration of “authoritarian liberalism” must appear to be so 
plausible that it almost looks trivial. Drastic historic examples such as Chile may come to mind. At 
a theoretical level, the writings by Friedrich August von Hayek have made it quite plain that eco-
nomic liberalism is not too easily reconciled with democratic majorities. Hayek believed that the 
ideal legislature would not be numerous and composed of persons of mature age, elected for a 
long period, such as fifteen years. Also, he wanted the election of representatives to be reduced 
to a once in a lifetime opportunity for citizens who belong to a certain age group. This would 
increase the incentive for choosing wisely.91 
The concept, however, loses its trivial ring if one moves beyond Heller and explores its deep am-
bivalence.  
“Authoritarian liberalism” can signify, first, a preservation strategy of economic liberalism to 
which the bourgeoisie shifts in times of crisis. This would be fully consistent with the prevalence 
of capitalism over democracy with which this article began. Economic liberalism would come first, 
authoritarianism second and play only an ancillary role. Owing to the prevalence of liberalism the 
authoritarianism would be rather mild and merely manifest, for example, in the indignation with 
which parliamentary opposition to austerity measures is met: they “do not get it,” they “act irre-
sponsibly,” they “have no idea what is at stake.”  
Yet, particularly in the context of the European Union we have to reckon with a second version of 
authoritarian liberalism. It would actually put authoritarianism at the centre and view liberalism 
as a means to pursue it. Again, liberalism would definitely exercise a tempering influence. 
In order to gain a better perspective on this second version, we again need to return to the 
1930s, in this case, to a first major work by the political scientist Eric(h) Voegelin. In his 1936 book 
The Authoritarian State,92 which appears to offer an apology of the Austrian Ständestaat,93 he re-
constructed the foundations of authoritarian governments under conditions where these con-
ceive of themselves as charged with a founding mission.  
                                                
91  See FRIEDRICH AUGUST VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOL. 3, 113 (Chicago University Press, 1979). See the 
highly instructive analysis by William E. Scheuerman, The Unholy Alliance of Carl Schmitt and Friedrich A. Hayek, 4 
CONSTELLATIONS, 1997, at 172. 
92  See ERICH VOEGELIN, DER AUTORITÄRE STAAT: EIN VERSUCH ÜBER DAS ÖSTERREICHISCHE STAATSPROBLEM (G. Winkler ed., 
Springer, 1997). The English translation is: THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE: AN ESSAY ON THE PROBLEM OF THE AUSTRIAN STATE 
(R. Hein trans., University of Missouri Press, 1989). 
93  See ERIKA WEINZIERL, Historical Commentary on the Period (F. Lawrence trans.) in THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 10, 27 
(note 92). 
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Drawing on the constitutional theory of Maurice Hauriou,94 Voegelin explains that the legitimacy of 
a government or of a ruler is derivative of their role in realising an institution—which was, in the 
case explored by Voegelin, the state. A government possesses authority to the extent that it suc-
ceeds at presenting itself as representative of the leading idea of an institution.95 A government 
has authority inasmuch as it actively and creatively works towards the realisation of this idea. 
What accounts for the legitimacy of an authoritarian government is this creative task.96 A gov-
ernment of this type is not bound by norms. The equivalence to legality is the impersonal idea of 
the institution.97 The deposit of authoritarian rule is the institution to which it gives birth as soon 
as it finds customary consent on the part of those who are subject to it (Consentement coutumier).  
These elementary ideas were reformulated—paradoxically, both more darkly and more starkly—
in what was to become Voegelin’s perhaps most famous work, namely, The New Science of Poli-
tics.98 In this book, the authoritarian ruler reappears in the guise of the “representative” that “ar-
ticulates” society. The “articulation” of society is characterised as the process by which human 
beings form themselves “into society for action”.99  This cannot be done without a representative. 
The implicit authoritarian element of representation is revealed in the two senses in which such 
representation is supposedly “existential”. First, the representative brings society into existence 
by virtue of having his acts imputed to something that would not be there if it were not for this 
imputation. Second, the representative de facto succeeds in the eyes of a multitude to have his or 
her acts count as acts of society. This is not a matter of formal legal procedures (“elemental rep-
resentation”) but of effectively generating obedience and cohesion vis-à-vis an idea.100  
Voegelin underscores that a representative is not an agent. The latter receives instructions, the 
former not: 
By an agent […] shall be understood a person who is empowered by his principal to transact a 
specific business under instructions, while by a representative shall be understood a person who 
has power to act for a society by virtue of his position in the structure of the community, without 
specific instructions for a specified business and whose acts will not be effectively repudiated by 
the members of society. 
Evidently, the creator of the governing institutions who assigns to himself the role of the repre-
sentative of society precedes all constitutional arrangements. He exercises the constituent power 
on behalf, not of a subject, but of an idea. Voegelin elaborates this connection between the au-
thority of the representative and the idea by adding another concept of representation, namely, 
“transcendental representation”.101 The idea is that a society itself is “representative of something 
beyond itself, of a transcendent reality.”102 Not by accident, Voegelin establishes a link between 
the two concepts of representation by seeing the existential representative in charge of repre-
senting the truth that society is supposed to live up to.103  
                                                
94  Carl Schmitt presents Hauriou’s constitutional theory with great fondness in his notorious 1934 pamphlet on three 
types of legal thought. See CARL SCHMITT, ON THE THREE TYPES OF JURISTIC THOUGHT (J. Bendersky trans., Praeger 2004). 
95  See Voegelin, note 92 at 48. (99 Eng. trans.) 
96  See ibid. at 182 (249-250 Eng. trans.). 
97  The source of authority remains anonymous. See ibid. at 185 (252 Eng. trans.). 
98  See ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION (2nd ed., Chicago University Press, 1987). 
99  See ibid. at 37. 
100  See ibid. at 49–50. 
101  See ibid. at 76. 
102  Ibid. 54. 
103  Ibid. at 75. 
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XII. Executive summary (as it behoves the topic) 
The analytical exercise is therewith completed. We have explored the close relationship between 
authority and delegations. The authority of a delegate becomes authoritarian if the delegate 
delegates on behalf of the delegator. The reason for a judgement substitution is a perceived 
incapacity on the part of the delegator to realise that delegation is rationally warranted. The two 
mechanisms for the reversal of authorisation are the modal openness of trust and the trust trap. 
They move a relationship into an authoritarian direction, which indicates a lack of democratic 
control and contestation.  
Authoritarian rule claims to be legitimate. It is supposed to be good for those who are subject to 
it. But since they, by definition, can neither assess the circumstances of rational delegation nor 
understand why they are better off on account of the delegate, they need to obey blindly. They 
have to be gullible. Of course, their gullibility is supposed to pay a dividend.104 The delegate may 
therefore rightly expect them to trust cognitively and to adjust their behaviour to whatever the 
delegate regards as an exercise of his power. 
It may be objected that the authoritarianism sketched here appears to be far too epistemic in its 
orientation and too benign in practice. Where are outright acts of oppression? Where is discrimi-
nation against minorities or the use of political justice105 in order to take care of political oppo-
nents? Without a doubt, these become part of authoritarian rule if people do not sheepishly suc-
cumb to the supposition that they are too dim-witted to decide whom to obey and for what rea-
son. Authoritarianism begins to look ugly when confronted with an unruly people. Nevertheless, 
repression is not one of its necessary components. If folks are sufficiently trusting, authoritarian 
rule can come with a much more friendly face. Think of Singapore.  
Authoritarian liberalism represents a commitment to the administration of free markets. It refuses 
to have delegations deconstructed in processes of public contestation and votes. Institutionally, it is 
visible in the constitutional entrenchment of economic liberties vis-à-vis legislatures or trade 
unions and in institutions that shift control of economic or monetary governance from the people 
to expert bodies and to the executive branch.  
Authoritarian liberalism is, however, ambivalent. If the emphasis rests on economic liberalism 
then authoritarian modes of policy definition and policy implementation are subservient to—
using old-fashioned parlance—the interests of private property. If, by contrast, the authoritarian 
realisation of a founding mission is at stake, economic liberalism may be a means of mitigating its 
impact by making it more palatable to the pursuit of the individual self-interest. 
XIII. Liberal and authoritarian authoritarian liberalism 
In the case of the European Union, the identifications of elements of authoritarian liberalism can 
be left to the discerning power of judgement. It is submitted here, however, that the European 
Union owes its appeal in no small part to the ambivalence of authoritarian liberalism. Authoritar-
ianism reinforces economic liberalism, which itself reinforces the authoritarian construction of  
 
                                                
104  See my Accidental Cosmopolitanism, 4 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY, 2012, at 371. 
105  See OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS (Princeton University Press, 
1969). 
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Europe. Governance from above can be justified with regard to the economy. Fixing the economy, 
in turn, benefits the European project. The people do not revolt. Supposedly, they are swayed by 
the “Idea” of Europe. 
More precisely, the liberal face of authoritarian liberalism is most clearly revealed—aside from 
the Lochner style jurisprudence on fundamental freedoms106—in the legal twists and turns under-
lying the introduction of fiscal and monetary crisis management. No longer is the law of the Trea-
ty limited to preventing irresponsible fiscal Member State policies and their balance of payment 
problems. They have been reread into a framework that can accommodate various strategies of 
crisis management. To that end, certain “clarifications” had to be made, in particular by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice,107 in order to cast into new light a Treaty that had not been designed with 
crisis management in mind. The necessity thereto arose for the purpose of reinforcing the lend-
ing power of Member States on financial markets. Had the Union done nothing for them, the 
interest for their debts would have skyrocketed for at least those states that could not but pump 
money into their collapsing banking system. Any default of one Member State would have had 
potentially disastrous consequences for the Euro Zone as a whole. The article has referred to 
these matters in the introduction.  
European crisis management is an example for how action taken under unforeseen adverse 
circumstances invites cognitive adaptation. The confrontation with what needs to be done in an 
unprecedented situation easily overrides what one would have previously imagined to be norma-
tive constraints on delegation. Such cognitive adaptations occur not least because delegations 
are based upon trust. The resulting fait accompli is often trailed by much erudite commentaries 
on the part of legal scholars. But commentaries have no power to change the world.  
The stretching of powers in order to stabilise the European economy is consistent with the liberal 
face of authoritarian liberalism. But what about its authoritarian counterpart? Arguably, one en-
counters the authoritarian face in the overall ethos of integration, in particular, in its often-
recognised absence of a final direction. 
According to Voegelin, an authoritarian ruler is in charge of creating institutions, thereby inviting 
loyalty to these creations. Eventually, institutions have to elicit customary consent to their exist-
ence. This authoritarian mode of “articulating society” is obviously reminiscent of the “neofunc-
tional” hypothesis according to which sectoral integration gives rise to political integration. The 
latter, according to Haas, is the “process whereby political actors in several distinct national set-
tings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre, 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states.”108 Such a 
shift concerns, however, mostly elites, that is, members of the public service and interested per-
sons from the private sector.109 Initially, Europe was to be made without Europeans, indeed, it 
                                                
106  See my Idealization, De-Politicization and Economic Due Process: System Transition in the European Union in THE 
LAW/POLITICS DISTINCTION IN CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION 137 (B. Iancu ed., Eleven International Publishing 
2009). 
107  See, notably, Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, [2012] ECR I-nyr. 
108  See ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES 1950-1957, 16 (Stanford University 
Press, 1958). 
109  See Philip Schmitter, Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism, 12 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 255, 
260 (2005). 
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has been established with the aim of creating Europeans. This goes to the heart of what Voegelin 
perceives authoritarian rule to accomplish: “authorship”.110 
The authoritarian spirit of European integration is ever more clearly revealed in the practice that 
Majone calls either “cryptofederalism” or “integration by stealth”. This is the method of integra-
tion that he attributes to Jean Monnet.111 Cryptofederalism is federalism short of a plan for a fed-
eral constitution. The forces and players driving the integration process do not work openly to-
wards a federal constitution—a goal that neofunctionalism still had in mind—but pursue a strat-
egy of “minor steps and grand effects” (Monnet).112 This strategy lacks, however, a final orienta-
tion. The movement towards “more Europe” takes the place of the goal. It becomes everything. 
Again, translating this mindset into Voegelin’s categories, it can be said that the repeated choice 
for “more Europe”, regardless of where it may arise, reveals an authoritarian faith that we are, if 
only we remain faithful enough, moving into the right direction. Not by accident, Majone diagno-
ses a lack of serious interest in what Europe is supposed to be and more “fascination with the 
process of institution-building.”113 The fait accompli, the creation of “more Europe” ad hoc, by 
taking little steps, is consistent with the faithful dedication to a cause whose ultimate justification 
no one understands. Europe rendered as “more Europe” is an authoritarian project that uses 
liberalism as its means. 
XIV. Conclusion 
The current governance of Economic and Monetary Union shows us the administrative face of 
the cosmopolitan constitution of its Member States.114 Generally, a constitution of this type 
commits states to submit their performance to processes of peer review. Its administrative di-
mension concerns the growing importance of transnational problem-solving processes, such as 
the surveillance and compliance mechanisms that were mentioned in the introduction to this 
article. In this context, the principle that powers be exercised proportionately is replaced with the 
principle that powers be proportionate to unpredictable challenges. Not surprisingly, executive 
powers grow. While parliaments no longer are the central locus of political authority, citizens 
retreat into the private sphere and allow themselves to be governed by those who claim to be in 
the know.  
But Europe is not doomed to stay the authoritarian liberal project that it currently is. The key to a 
change may well be that governments of the Member States pass on to the Union the democratic 
resistance that they encounter at home.115 This is perfectly legitimate for the reason that the 
current situation does in no manner generate “output legitimacy.” More precisely, the output 
legitimacy exists only for the lending Northern Member States.116 The Euro has not collapsed and 
the budgetary expenses for rescue measures have been minimal so far. They enjoy the benefits 
of the Euro Zone. It allows them to operate with what is effectively an undervalued currency.  
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Some Southern Member States get the raw end of the deal. They do not benefit from Europe’s 
arrogation of delegated authority. Under such unequal conditions it makes sense for them to act 
in a manner as though the public power that rules them were illegal and illegitimate.  
There is no other alternative left for the Southern Member States than to alter an equilibrium in 
which they have no bargaining power. They can only affect it still by threatening to leave the Euro 
Zone. While this would make an end to all rescue credits from ESM and all OMT support from the 
ECB it would also reintroduce the specter of the collapse of the Euro. While such a scenario is 
quite regrettable, it is to be feared that defection is the only leverage left to these states to moti-
vate Northern States to rethink and to renegotiate the project of Economic and Monetary Union. 
